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Informants are witnesses who often testify in exchange for an incentive (i.e. jailhouse
informant, cooperating witness). Despite the widespread use of informants, little is known
about the circumstances surrounding their use at trial. This study content-analyzed trials from
22 DNA exoneration cases involving 53 informants. Because these defendants were
exonerated, the prosecution informant testimony is demonstrably false. Informant
characteristics including motivation for testifying, criminal history, relationship with the
defendant and testimony were coded. Most informants were prosecution jailhouse informants;
however, there were also defence jailhouse informants and prosecution cooperating witnesses.
Regardless of informant type, most denied receiving an incentive, had criminal histories, were
friends/acquaintances of the defendant and had testimonial inconsistencies. In closing
statements, attorneys relied on informant testimony by either emphasizing or questioning its
reliability. The impact of informant testimony on jurors’ decisions is discussed in terms of
truth-default theory (TDT), the fundamental attribution error and prosecutorial vouching.
Key words: jailhouse informant; cooperating witness; truth-default theory; secondary
confessions.

In the Nassau County Courthouse on 12
November 1986, Samuel Newsome took the
witness stand and promised to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth. He
testified that he had heard the defendant,
Dennis Halstead, confess to the rape and murder of a young girl while the two were playing
spades in jail together. Newsome had a long
criminal history, and the defence attorney suggested at trial that the criminal charges against
him were being dropped in exchange for his
testimony. The prosecution had only circumstantial evidence and therefore their star witness was Newsome. He proved to be an
effective witness, providing a detailed account

of how the victim was raped and killed,
including where she had been picked up, the
vehicle that was used and even that the defendant had smiled while committing the act.
Despite his adamant claims of innocence,
Halstead was convicted of rape and murder
and sentenced to 331=3 years to life. Nineteen
years later, DNA evidence conclusively
proved that Halstead could not have been the
perpetrator; he was exonerated on 29
December 2005. Research has shown that false
testimony from informants like Samuel
Newsome is one of the leading causes of the
growing number of wrongful convictions
(Gross et al., 2005; Warden, 2005).

Correspondence: Jeffrey S. Neuschatz, Department of Psychology, The University of Alabama in
Huntsville, CTC 200D, Huntsville, AL 35899, USA. E-mail: neuschaj@uah.edu
© 2020 The Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law

Informant Witnesses
Since DNA testing became available in the
late 1980s, there have been over 350 DNA
exonerations of wrongfully convicted individuals. The Innocence Project lists informant testimony among the major contributing factors
to wrongful convictions, along with eyewitness misidentification, faulty forensic science,
false confessions, government misconduct and
inadequate defence (http://www.innocenceproject.org). In capital cases, false testimony from
informants is the leading cause of wrongful
convictions, with informant testimony present
in 49.5% of cases since the mid-1970s
(Warden, 2005). According to the Innocence
Project, informant testimony contributed to
more than 15% of the wrongful convictions
that were later overturned through DNA testing (http://www.innocenceproject.org). Courts
have repeatedly indicated that offering incentives to informants provides enormous motivation to give false testimony and evidence
(Giglio v. United States, 1972; United States v.
Singleton, 1998).
Generally, accurate informant testimony is
an effective means of securing convictions
against guilty defendants. Ideally, false
informant testimony should be detected as
false by the judges and juries charged with
hearing criminal cases. However, as the many
wrongful convictions clearly demonstrate,
false informant testimony can be compelling
evidence against innocent defendants. In order
to better understand the influence of informant
testimony, DNA exoneration cases involving
53 informants were content analyzed. These
cases provide a critical context in which to
evaluate and understand informant testimony
because any testimony implicating the defendant is demonstrably false, as proven by the
subsequent DNA exoneration.
Informant witnesses
Informants, in the most general sense, are individuals who provide information about criminal activity. Sometimes informants are
recruited by the government to infiltrate criminal circles and collect incriminating evidence,
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and sometimes informants initiate contact with
the government because they possess incriminating information and have the hope of gaining some incentive in exchange for reporting
it. This paper investigates the latter type; that
is, informants who collect or encounter
incriminating evidence by themselves rather
than being planted by the government. The
evidence given by these informants has often
been referred to as ‘bartered testimony’,
because the informant has negotiated a deal in
return for their cooperation (Roth, 2016).
Within this definition of informant there
are three subtypes: jailhouse informants, cooperating witnesses and accomplice witnesses
(Roth, 2016). Jailhouse informants are individuals who gain evidence about a fellow
inmate’s case while they are both in custody
and who often come forward in return for
some promised incentive. Jailhouse informants’ testimony typically includes a secondary
confession, meaning that they claim to have
heard the defendant confess to committing the
crime (Neuschatz et al., 2008). Cooperating
witnesses are citizens with incriminating evidence about a defendant’s case but who
require an incentive to testify. Cooperating
witnesses typically learn about a case through
some connection to the defendant (e.g. they
are a friend) or through their own experiences
(e.g. as an eyewitness). For example, an eyewitness may be reluctant to testify for fear of
retaliation, thus prosecutors may provide some
type of incentive (e.g. relocation funds) to
secure their testimony. Finally, accomplice
witnesses are individuals who allegedly committed the crime with the defendant but testify
against the defendant for some leniency in
their own case. The present research is focused
on jailhouse informants and cooperating witnesses (but not accomplice witnesses), and
therefore the term ‘informant’ is used to refer
to these two types collectively.
Despite the prevalence of informants,
especially in capital cases, their contribution to
wrongful convictions has not been sufficiently
studied (Roth, 2016). By contrast, eyewitness
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identification – another leading cause of
wrongful conviction – has received a great
deal of attention from both the scientific and
legal communities. A search of PsycINFO
revealed 786 peer-reviewed studies pertaining
to eyewitness identification; however, a search
for jailhouse informants and cooperating witnesses produced only 9 peer-reviewed studies,
6 of which address the impact of informant
testimony on juror decision-making. What little research has been done demonstrated that
jurors’ verdicts are uninfluenced by informants’ incentives for testifying (i.e. no incentive
vs. a five-year reduction in sentence) or by
their role in the case (i.e. jailhouse informant,
accomplice witness or civilian; Neuschatz
et al., 2012). These studies have also demonstrated that jurors hold a number of erroneous
beliefs about informant testimony (Key et al.,
2018), are unable to detect that informants
may be lying and rely heavily on informants’
testimony when making verdict decisions
(Wetmore et al., 2014). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the information that informants provide and the reasons why jurors may
be unable to detect their deception. The current
analysis addresses these two questions by documenting what informants testified about and
how attorneys used the testimony in their arguments to jurors.
Deception detection
There are several findings from the deception
detection and attribution literatures that elucidate why jurors tend to believe that informants
are telling the truth: they rely on inappropriate
cues, exist in a truth-default state, identify
when testimony matches the fact pattern of the
case and succumb to the fundamental attribution error (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). First, in
order for jurors to assess informant testimony
accurately they must be able to identify cues
that indicate truth telling and deception.
Unfortunately, people are generally poor at
detecting deception, as accuracy rates are usually at chance levels in studies which have
examined this ability (see Vrij et al., 2010).

One reason for this is that people often rely on
cues which they believe to be indicative of
deception, but in fact are not. For instance, it
has been found that behaviors which are often
believed to be associated with lying (e.g. averting one’s eyes, shifting in one’s seat or fidgeting) are in fact not at all related to deception
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2000).
Second, not only do people rely on the
wrong cues but they are also naturally inclined
to believe that other people are telling the truth
– that is, they have a truth bias. According to
Levine (2014), people naturally exist in a
truth-default state, meaning that they initially
evaluate all incoming messages as truthful
unless there is a reason to suspect deception.
Furthermore, people do not actively look for
deception; rather, they have to be compelled to
do so. The inclination to believe that people
are being truthful and honest may be strengthened in the courtroom, where witnesses must
take an oath to tell the truth and where jurors
rely on prosecutorial vouching – that is, the
belief that prosecutors rigorously vet their witnesses and would not let a dishonest witness
testify (Covey, 2014; Roth, 2016).
Third, it may be especially difficult to
detect deception when it is embedded in a narrative that is factually accurate. Vrij et al.
(2010) have suggested that rather than telling
lies which are completely untrue, people often
change a few details of an otherwise true
account. This strategy tends to be true of criminals (see Hartwig et al., 2007). For example,
it has been found that when criminals assume
a false identity they only change a small portion of their actual identity (Wang et al.,
2004). Informants may adopt a similar strategy, weaving a few lies into an otherwise factually accurate depiction of the case (e.g. facts
gathered from media coverage, non-public
facts given by the police), making them more
believable and making it more difficult for
jurors to detect their deception. Along with the
presence of accurate facts and details in their
accounts, informants are also more likely to be
believed if they are thought to be testifying
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against their self-interest (e.g. they may be
harmed in jail or a family member may be put
in danger as a result of testifying). According
to Kassin (2015), statements made against
self-interest are reflexively believed.
Lastly, determining whether the evidence
points to deception or truth may be very difficult; not only can deception be embedded in
accurate facts but individuals often make the
fundamental attribution error, or have a correspondence bias, when evaluating others – even
informants (Neuschatz et al., 2008; Ross,
1977). The fundamental attribution error refers
to the tendency for individuals to overestimate
dispositional factors and underestimate situational factors when explaining other people’s
behavior (Ross, 1977). Therefore, when evaluating an informant’s motives for testifying,
jurors will identify dispositional reasons (e.g.
trying to do the right thing) rather than relying
on situational factors (e.g. incentives
to cooperate).
Given the issues laid out above, we coded
all the DNA exoneration cases involving
informants in order to provide some insight
into why their testimony was believed by the
jurors. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know
from this set of cases whether or not the jurors
detected the appropriate cues or how they
evaluated the evidence. However, it is possible
to address various aspects of the cases that
relate specifically to the narratives provided by
the informants and attorneys, whether statements against self-interest were made or not
and whether dispositional or situational
explanations for testifying were present. In
order to evaluate the narrative components of
the case, we coded the informants’ testimony
for the number of case details and their accuracy, the presence of inconsistencies, how they
purportedly heard the confession (if at all),
whether or not they received an incentive and
whether or not they testified against their selfinterest. In addition, we also coded the closing
arguments made by the prosecuting and
defence attorneys to further evaluate the case
facts presented during the trial, the presence of
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inconsistencies in the informants’ testimony
and whether or not any ulterior motives or
alternative explanations for the informants’
testimony were explored.
It is clear that in some, if not all, of
the cases examined herein, the juries failed
to detect the deceptive nature of the informants’ testimony. Nonetheless, it is still an
important first step in better understanding
the impact of informant testimony to analyze what the informants actually said at
trial and how they were portrayed by both
the prosecution and the defence. This is
important because the way in which attorneys portray informants likely influences
jurors’ perceptions of their truthfulness,
which may in turn affect verdict decisions.
Because there is scant research on the content of informant testimony, this study is by
necessity exploratory. Even so, some predictions could be derived from the deception
detection and attribution literatures. First,
because it has been shown that the majority
of informants are repeat players (Roth,
2016), we hypothesized that the informants
in the present study would also be found to
have prior convictions and previous involvement in the criminal justice system
(Hypothesis 1). Second, we expected to find
that the informants made statements against
their self-interest in order to increase their
credibility (Hypothesis 2). Kassin (2015)
argues that false confessions are persuasive
because people reflexively believe that statements made against self-interest are true;
therefore, to the extent that jurors perceive
informants to be making such statements,
they may be more likely to accept their testimony as truthful. Third, we predicted that
the informants would be found to have
given dispositional reasons for their testimony (e.g. they felt bad for the family)
rather than situational explanations (e.g.
receiving an incentive; Hypothesis 3).
Finally, we expected to find that the prosecutors and defence attorneys specifically
addressed the informants’ motivations in
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their cross-examinations and closing arguments (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Trial transcripts
We identified and coded all 22 trial transcripts
in the Innocence Record that contain at least 1
informant. We defined an informant as someone who claimed to have obtained evidence
about the defendant’s case while incarcerated
(i.e. a jailhouse informant) or someone who
learned about the case through some connection with the defendant or through their own
experiences but required an incentive to testify
(i.e. a cooperating witness). This study is
focused exclusively on wrongful conviction
cases overturned by incontrovertible DNA evidence. Consequently, these cases provide
known examples of instances when informants
provided false incriminating testimony in court
(excluding the informants who testified for the
defence). There are 28 defendants in the identified cases, all of whom were convicted of
major crimes: 4 for murder, 6 for rape and 18
for both murder and rape. There are 53 informants in the identified cases (43 jailhouse
informants, 10 cooperating witnesses); of the
43 jailhouse informants, 34 testified for
the prosecution (79.07%) and 9 testified for
the defence (20.93%). All 10 of the cooperating witnesses were called to testify for the
prosecution.
Data analysis
In order to analyze the data, we developed a
coding scheme to capture information about:
(1) the defendants; (2) the jailhouse informants
for the prosecution; (3) the jailhouse informants for the defence; (4) the cooperating witnesses for the prosecution; and (5) the
attorneys’ closing arguments.
Defendants
The demographic information for the defendants includes age, gender, race, education,

criminal history, crime date, trial date, presence of multiple trials, sentence and exoneration date. The details of the defendants’
testimony include: response to a secondary
confession (where relevant); type of contact
with the informant; and relationship with
the informant.
Jailhouse informants and cooperating witnesses for the prosecution
The demographic information for the jailhouse informants and cooperating witnesses
presented by the prosecution includes age,
gender, race, education, criminal history,
current incarceration and testifying history.
The details of these informants’ testimony
include: a description of the secondary confession (if applicable) or details about the
event; the amount of time between the point
at which the secondary confession was
alleged to have been witnessed (if applicable) and the point at which the informant
contacted the prosecutor or police; incentives, motivations and deterrents related to
testifying; prior knowledge of the crime; the
number of details of the crime that were
given; testimonial inconsistencies; the type
of contact between the informant and the
defendant; and the informant’s relationship
to the defendant.
Jailhouse informants for the defence
The demographic information for the jailhouse
informants presented by the defence (no cooperating witnesses were presented) includes the
number of prior convictions and details of their
criminal history. The details of these informants’ testimony include: the topics discussed;
the incentives and motivations for testifying;
and the informant’s relationship to the defendant. The informants presented by the defence
had an overall different purpose for testifying
(i.e. impeaching the informants presented
by the prosecution) – therefore, fewer variables in the coding scheme are relevant to
their testimony.

Informant Witnesses
Attorneys’ closing arguments
The content of the prosecution and defence
attorneys’ closing arguments includes whether
or not they contain mention of: the informant’s
criminal history; incentives and motivations
for testifying; testimonial inconsistencies; nonpublic details given during testimony; credibility of the defence’s informant (if applicable);
and overall truthfulness of the testimony.
Additional coding
The informant’s motivation for testifying and
consistency of testimony were also coded. The
informant’s motivation was coded as situational, dispositional or both. A situational
motivation is characterized as an informant
acknowledging that their reason for testifying
was due to external influences promoting personal gain – for example, receiving some type
of incentive such as a reduced prison sentence
or a monetary reward. A dispositional motivation is characterized as an informant stating
that their reason for testifying was due to
internal characteristics, such as wanting to do
the right thing, empathizing with the victim or
wanting to help the victim’s family.
Inconsistencies within an informant’s testimony were coded as present or absent. If
inconsistencies were found to be present, they
were further categorized into three different
types. First, there could be inconsistency
between the informant’s current testimony and
the actual case facts or details of the crime.
For example, the informant could have relayed
incorrect information about the timing of the
crime or the weapon that was used during its
commission. Second, there could be inconsistency between the informant’s current testimony and prior statements given to the police
or prosecutor. For instance, the informant
could have initially provided one description
of a defendant’s secondary confession to the
police and then altered the details by the time
they presented that information at trial.
Finally, there could be inconsistency between
the informant’s current and previous testimony
at trial. For example, the informant could have
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initially provided testimony in front of a grand
jury or alternate trial and then changed their
testimony at a different hearing or trial. This
also includes informants stating contradictory
information within the same trial if their testimony changed between cross-examination and
re-direct examination.
At least two independent raters coded each
transcript. Afterward, two authors reviewed
the coding to evaluate the coding decisions.
Any differences between the initial coders
were resolved by the authors. The interrater
reliability was calculated for 20% of the cases
and is sufficiently high, with an average kappa
of .877.
Missing data
Data are not available for every variable for all
28 defendants and 53 informants (43 jailhouse
informants and 10 cooperating witnesses) due
to the following reasons: (1) missing transcript
pages; (2) the variable being nested within
another variable such that the coding of the
higher-order variable makes the lower-order
variable not applicable (e.g. if there are no
inconsistencies present within an informant’s
testimony then the subsequent type of inconsistency variable is not applicable); or (3) the
attorneys never mentioning the variable during
the trial proceedings. Thus, the amount of
missing data differs for each variable. To
account for these differences, we calculated
sample sizes for each variable by subtracting
the number of informants/defendants with
missing data from the total number of informants/defendants. We only considered data
‘missing’ for the purposes of these sample size
calculations if they were not coded for the first
two reasons stated above (i.e. missing transcript pages or nested variables). Accordingly,
the sample sizes still include defendants and
informants who were not asked about the target variable during the trial proceedings, as we
deemed it important to highlight the absence
of critical information from the trial. For
example, although we coded a total of 34 jailhouse informants for the prosecution, the
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sample size for prior convictions is only 32
because transcript pages were missing for this
portion of the testimony of 2 informants; however, that sample of 32 includes 6 informants
who were not asked about their prior convictions during the trial. If the final sample size
includes less than the total number of people
in the applicable category (i.e. less than 28
defendants, 34 jailhouse informants for the
prosecution, 9 jailhouse informants for the
defence or 10 cooperating witnesses) then we
report the number that was used to calculate
the percentages next to each result.
Results
Defendants
The defendants were all male. At the time that
the crime was committed, the average age of
the defendant was 25.21 years (SD ¼ 6.55); at
the time of the trial, the average age of the
defendant was 27.57 years (SD ¼ 7.10). Most
of the defendants had only one trial (60.71%);
however, 11 had multiple trials pertaining to
their current offense (39.29%), each of which
may or may not have included a jailhouse
informant. The defendants are mostly
Caucasian (60.71%), followed by African
American (32.14%) and Hispanic (7.14%).
Jailhouse informants for the prosecution
A total of 34 jailhouse informants testified for
the prosecution against 22 of the 28 defendants; 1 informant was coded twice because she
testified in two separate trials against different
defendants. The informants were mostly male
(91.18%) and had a mean age of 29.55 years
(SD ¼ 11.32, based on 21 available) when
they testified at trial.
Criminal background
Most of the jailhouse informants for the prosecution were incarcerated for nonviolent
crimes when they testified at the defendant’s
trial (68.75% of 32 available); these include
crimes that do not rely on a weapon (e.g.

burglary, theft; 50.00% of 32 available),
crimes that involve deceit (e.g. perjury, fraud;
12.50% of 32 available) or both (6.25% of 32
available). A smaller proportion of these
informants were incarcerated for violent
crimes (e.g. murder, sexual assault; 21.88% of
32 available) or a combination of violent and
nonviolent crimes (9.38% of 32 available).
Three quarters of these informants were
found to have a prior history with the criminal
justice system (75.00% of 32 available), consistent with Hypothesis 1. Surprisingly, the
defence attorneys and prosecutors questioned
these informants about their criminal histories
at an equal rate (79.31% of 29 available for
both the defence and the prosecution).
However, despite the vast majority of these
informants having had frequent run-ins with
the criminal justice system, most were never
asked during the trial if they had ever previously testified for the prosecution (68.97% of
29 available). Of the 9 informants who were
asked whether or not they had previously testified, 7 responded that they had (77.78% of
9 applicable).
Motives for testifying
Given the argument that incentives are the
main motivation for informants to testify, it is
not surprising that the majority of the jailhouse
informants for the prosecution were asked if
they were receiving anything in exchange for
their testimony by both the prosecution and
the defence (see Table 1). More specifically,
28 informants (of 32 available) were questioned by the prosecution (71.43%) and/or the
defence (75.00%) about whether or not they
were provided with any incentive to testify. Of
these 28 informants, 12.50% admitted to
receiving an incentive. In one case, the informant openly admitted that he was receiving a
reduced sentence on an unrelated charge in
exchange for his testimony against Kenneth
Wyniemko (Trial Transcript, 1994, p. WYN000333). He stated that the prosecutor had
promised that he would only need to spend
one year in prison for his conviction of

Informant Witnesses
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Table 1. Percentages of variables coded from jailhouse informant and cooperating witness testimony
in the DNA exoneration cases.
Variable

Coding category

Jailhouse informant

Cooperating witness

Incentive

Receiving
Not receiving
n/a
Missing
N

12.50%
75.00%
12.50%
2
32

22.22%
66.67%
11.11%
1
9

Not given
Situational
Dispositional
Both
n/a
Missing
N

0.00%
13.79%
44.83%
0.00%
41.38%
5
29

20.00%
0.00%
40.00%
10.00%
30.00%
0
10

Dangerous
Inconvenience
Relationship w/def.
Both
n/a
Missing
N

34.48%
3.45%
0.00%
3.45%
58.62%
5
29

40.00%
0.00%
10.00%
0.00%
40.00%
0
9

Present
Not present
Missing
N

64.29%
35.71%
6
28

70.00%
30.00%
0
10

Motivation

Deterrents to testifying

Inconsistencies

Note: Two informants provided no motivation and 1 informant provided multiple motivations. One informant
stated their relationship with the defendant.

unarmed robbery as opposed to five, which is
the standard sentence for this class of felony.
Nevertheless, the majority of these informants
(75.00%) explicitly denied receiving anything
in exchange for their testimony. This corresponds with the finding that of the 18 jailhouse
informants for the prosecution who were asked
why they had decided to testify, 77.79% provided a dispositional motivation such as wanting to do the right thing or testifying out of the
goodness of their heart, consistent with
Hypothesis 3. For instance, one informant
stated in his testimony against John Restivo:
‘It’s something I’m doing as a man. I feel it’s
the right thing to do … ’ (Trial Transcript,
1986a, p. RHK-014802).
The amount of time between the point at
which the informant allegedly heard the

defendant’s secondary confession and
the point at which they subsequently contacted
the police or prosecutor with this information
is available in the trial transcripts for 17
informants. It ranges from less than one day to
two and a half years, with 24.14% (of 17 available) reportedly contacting the authorities
within two days. Some of the informants
claimed that they had been hesitant to contact
the police or prosecutor out of fear of being
labeled as a snitch. For example, one informant – in his testimony against Curtis McCarty
– stated that he had waited to contact the prosecutor because he believed that he might have
been in danger ‘if the people there in the tank
found out that I told anybody about it’ (Trial
Transcript,
1986b,
p.
MCC-004042).
Throughout the trials, 37.93% of the jailhouse
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informants for the prosecution (of 29 available) recounted similar deterrents to testifying
by claiming that they now feared for their personal safety, consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Confession circumstances
Nearly all of the jailhouse informants for the
prosecution testified about an alleged secondary confession (93.94% of 33 available),
which comprised their role in the trial. There
were only 2 informants who did not provide
secondary confession evidence (6.06% of 33
available); the first was acquainted with the
defendant outside of prison and was able to
verify that the defendant owned the type of
weapon that was used during the crime, and
the second merely corroborated that the
defendant had spoken with another jailhouse
informant who claimed to have heard a secondary confession. Some of these informants
never explained how the secondary confession
occurred (37.93% of 29 available). However,
those who did explain (n ¼ 16) most commonly claimed that the defendant had confessed to them only after being directly asked
whether or not they were guilty (43.75%),
whereas others claimed that the defendant had
confessed on their own without any
prompting (25.00%) or that they had overheard the defendant confessing to someone
else (18.75%).
In order to establish some credibility for
their testimony, informants must show that
they have had the opportunity to converse with
the defendant. Indeed, almost all of the informants indicated during their testimony that just
such an opportunity had arisen. In fact,
approximately half of them testified that they
were housed in the same area as the defendant
at the time (51.72% of 29 available) – in the
same cell, tier, block or anywhere else that
permitted them to come into contact with each
other. A total of 24 informants described the
nature of their relationship with the defendant
(82.76% of 29 available): 54.17% as acquaintances (they knew each other but had no

significant relationship), 20.83% as friends
(either from in prison or outside of prison)
and 20.83% as complete strangers.
Alongside their relationship with the
defendant, 24 informants also described the
nature of their contact with them (82.76%
of 29 available): 5 informants testified to
having had singular contact with the
defendant while incarcerated (i.e. they only
met once; 20.83% of 24 applicable), 2
informants stated that they were merely
acquaintances of the defendant (8.33% of
24 applicable) and 3 informants admitted to
having no relationship at all with the
defendant (12.50% of 24 applicable). One
informant claimed that he first met the
defendant, Wilton Dedge, in a prison transport van, and that during their short time
together Dedge confessed that he had
‘raped and cut some old hog’ after being
asked what he had done to get a 90-year
sentence (Trial Transcript, 1984, p.
DED-000735).
Secondary confession details
As mentioned earlier, it can be more difficult
to detect deception when it is embedded in
truth. Therefore, the testimonies of the jailhouse informants for the prosecution were
evaluated for the number of crime details they
include. Each testimony contains an average
of 4.5 crime details (SD ¼ 3.2, based on 32
available) with a maximum of 12 details,
although 3 informants did not provide any
crime details at all. For example, one informant stated that the defendant, Rolando Cruz,
had told him that he was going to write a book
entitled How to Kill Little Girls but had never
actually described the murder (Trial
Transcript, 1985b, p. HERN-034023). Details
were coded as accurate if they were found to
be consistent with verifiable facts of the crime.
Although some of the details are unverifiable
(e.g. claims about what the victim said while
being attacked), on average 66.95% of the
details stated by each informant were found to
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be accurate (based on the 28 informants who
provided details that could be verified as
accurate).1 Details were coded as inaccurate if
they were found to directly contradict the factual details of the crime. On average, 12.81%
of the details stated by each informant were
found to be inaccurate (based on the 29
informants who provided details that could be
verified as inaccurate). For instance, one
informant testified that the defendant, Chad
Heins, had confessed that he had ‘stabbed [the
victim] and assaulted her and made it look like
a burglary’ (Trial Transcript, 1996a, p. HEI001748). Although the victim had indeed been
stabbed and assaulted, the crime scene experts
who had testified earlier in the trial had explicitly stated that there were no indications of
burglary (no forced entry, the victim was
wearing all of her jewelry, etc.), a fact that was
central to the prosecution’s case. Most of the
informants (66.67% of 30 available) were
questioned on whether or not they had learned
about the crime from somewhere else (e.g.
newspapers, TV), conceivably to help the
jurors ascertain whether or not the defendant’s
alleged confession was the true source of the
crime details being given by the informants.
Of those informants who were asked (n ¼ 20),
85.00% denied having any prior knowledge
about the crime. Additionally, 4 informants’
testimonies include one or more accurate
details that had never been released to the general public (14.29% of 28 available).
Most of the jailhouse informants for the
prosecution were inconsistent in their reports
(64.29% of 28 available). Of those informants
(n ¼ 18), most exhibited inconsistency
between their current testimony and the actual
case facts (55.56%), followed by inconsistency
between their current and previous testimony
(50.00%) and inconsistency between their current testimony and the prior statement reported
to the police or prosecutors (50.00%). These
1
This percentage was calculated by first dividing the
number of accurate details by the total number of
crime details for each jailhouse informant for the
prosecution, then averaging.
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values add up to more than 100.00% due to
the fact that half of the informants exhibited
more than one type of inconsistency in their
testimony. For example, in the trial of Dennis
Williams and Willie Rainge, the informant
continually mixed up what he had allegedly
heard each defendant confess. In his original
police report and during the prosecutor’s direct
examination, he stated that Williams had
claimed to have hidden the weapon. However,
during cross-examination, he switched the
details and stated that Rainge had claimed to
have hidden the weapon. Furthermore, later on
within the same testimony he switched back
again to Williams, stating that Williams had
claimed to have hidden the weapon. In crossexamination, the defence attorney asked him:
‘That wasn’t too hard to memorize. Why did
you forget?’ (Trial Transcript, 1978c, p.
WILLD-000706). This type of inconsistency
was coded as both inconsistency between current and previous testimony and inconsistency
between current testimony and the prior statement provided to the police.
Jailhouse informants for the defense
A total of 9 jailhouse informants presented by
the defence testified for 6 of the 28 defendants;
2 defendants (7.14%) had multiple informants
testify on their behalf. Based on the available
data, 5 informants had at least one prior conviction for a nonviolent crime (e.g. burglary,
delivery of a controlled substance, trespassing;
62.50% of 8 available) and 4 informants had
at least one prior conviction for a violent crime
(e.g. murder, armed robbery; 50.00% of 8
available). The attorneys asked 7 informants
about their relationship with the defendant, of
which 3 reported being friends with the
defendant in prison (42.86%), 3 reported being
acquaintances of the defendant (42.86%) and
1 reported not knowing the defendant (14.29%).
The testimony of the jailhouse informants
for the defence often included information
concerning the jailhouse informants for the
prosecution (77.78%). Specifically, the

518

J. S. Neuschatz et al.

informants for the defence often testified about
the motives of the informants for the prosecution for testifying. For example, one informant
for the defence testified that an informant for
the prosecution had told him: ‘this time is killing me and I’m going to set [the defendant] up
[ … ] I’m going to get this 20 years up off me
man, I can’t take it’ (Defendant-Appellant’s
Brief, 1994, HUNT-000276). Another informant for the defence testified about the same
informant for the prosecution, stating that he
had said ‘that he expected to be out of prison
by October and that no matter what it took or
who he had to burn that he was going to get
out of prison’ (Defendant-Appellant’s Brief,
1994, p. HUNT-000276). In another trial, the
informant for the defence testified that he had
heard the informant for the prosecution say
that ‘they were going to get some of their time
knocked off, they were doing something to get
some of their time taken care of’ and that ‘they
were going to jump on [the defendant’s] case.
Which meant testify against him’ (Trial
Transcript, 1996b, p. HEI-001993).
The two jailhouse informants for the
defence who did not testify about jailhouse
informants for the prosecution both testified
for the same defendant, Jerry Watkins. Both of
these informants provided information concerning the character of the defendant, as they
were acquainted with him through various
prison activities, including church and
Bible study.
None of the jailhouse informants for the
defence explicitly stated that they were receiving an incentive for testifying after being asked
by either the prosecutor or the defence attorney. Additionally, most of these informants
did not testify as to their motivation for testifying; only one explained his reason for testifying, which was that friends ‘watch out for
each other’ (Trial Transcript, 1996b, p.
HEI-002006).
Cooperating witnesses for the prosecution
A total of 10 cooperating witnesses testified
for the prosecution against 13 of the 28

defendants. Of these, 2 witnesses (20.00%)
testified against multiple defendants and 2
defendants (7.14%) had multiple witnesses
testify against them. One trial was missing all
transcripts but contained limited information
about the witnesses in the appeals documents;
therefore, the statistics reported below are
based on the available data for each variable.
Demographics
The cooperating witnesses were mostly male
(80.00%) and had a mean age of 26.50 years
(SD ¼ 5.78) when they testified at trial. They
reported varying involvement with the crime:
7 witnesses claimed to have learned about the
crime through their associations with the
defendant (70.00%), 2 witnesses claimed to
be eyewitnesses (20.00%) and 1 witness
allegedly overheard the defendant confess at
the crime scene (10.00%). They also reported
varying relationships with the defendants: 5
witnesses claimed to be friends with the
defendant (50.00%), 4 witnesses claimed to
be acquaintances of the defendant (40.00%)
and 1 witness claimed not to know the
defendant (10.00%).
Criminal background
Defense attorneys questioned 7 witnesses
(77.78% of 9 available) and prosecutors questioned 5 witnesses (55.56% of 9 available)
about their criminal history. Most of the witnesses reported prior experience with the criminal justice system; 6 had at least one prior
conviction for a nonviolent crime (e.g. burglary, drug possession, unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle; 66.67% of 9 available), 2 had
at least one prior conviction for a violent crime
(e.g. rape, murder; 22.22% of 9 available) and
1 had at least one prior conviction for a crime
of dishonesty (i.e. forgery; 11.11% of 9 available). Attorneys asked only 1 witness whether
or not he had testified for the prosecution in
the past (11.11% of 9 available), to which he
responded negatively.
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Motives for testifying
Defense attorneys asked all of the witnesses
(100.00% of 9 available) and prosecutors
asked 3 witnesses (33.33% of 9 available)
whether or not they were receiving an incentive in exchange for their testimony (see
Table 1). The majority of the witnesses
explicitly stated during their testimony that
they were not receiving an incentive (55.56%
of 9 available), but 3 admitted that they were
(33.33% of 9 available), which included
funding to relocate (66.67% of 3 applicable)
and a reduced sentence for pending charges
(33.33% of 3 applicable). In fact, 1 witness
explicitly stated that he would not have testified without receiving an incentive, which
was relocation for his family and himself.
The defence attorney asked when he and the
prosecutor had ‘decided’ that he had seen the
defendants, to which he replied: ‘I decided
that when I was going to be relocated [ … ] I
wasn’t going to testify against them and live
there since everybody around there is kin,
some kin and relatives and girlfriends and
what have you’ (Trial Transcript, 1978b, p.
WILLD-000208).
Attorneys also questioned the majority
of the witnesses about their motivations for
testifying (60.00%) and any deterrents to
testifying (60.00%). Of these witnesses, 2
explicitly provided dispositional motivations
(e.g. wanting to be a good citizen; 33.33% of
6 applicable), 1 provided a situational motivation (i.e. she felt that her family was in danger; 16.67% of 6 applicable) and 1 provided
both dispositional and situational motivations (i.e. thinking about his family and
wanting to be relocated; 16.67% of 6 applicable) One witness claimed that she felt compelled to testify: ‘in view of everything that
happened [ … ] I just felt that we were all in
extreme danger and I could no longer jeopardize [my family’s] lives and I just couldn’t
hold back anymore’ (Trial Transcript, 1977,
p. EVA-000473). Although fear was a motivating factor for this witness, it was also the
most prevalent deterrent; 4 witnesses
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explicitly stated that perceived danger, or
fear for their own or their family’s safety,
had made them hesitant to contact the police
and testify at trial (66.67% of 6 applicable).
Testimony details
The cooperating witnesses’ testimony includes
an average of 4.8 crime details (range ¼
112). None of the witnesses provided nonpublic crime details and only one provided
verifiably inaccurate crime details, testifying
that the crime had occurred during the summer
when it had actually occurred in November
and that the defendant had picked up the victim from a roller-skating rink when other evidence verified that she had left the rink and
gone to a restaurant before the crime
had occurred.
The testimony of 7 witnesses was found
to be inconsistent with what they had
reported in the past (70.00%). Of these witnesses, all 7 exhibited inconsistency
between their current testimony and what
they had previously reported to the police
or prosecutor (100.00% of 7 applicable).
For example, 1 witness had originally told
the police that she had witnessed the crime
after leaving work at 6:37 p.m.; however,
at trial she testified that she had actually
left her workplace at around 8:00 p.m.,
which was verified as the approximate time
at which the victim had left her house,
shortly before the crime had occurred.
Another 3 witnesses exhibited inconsistency
within their testimony (42.86% of 7 applicable), such as 1 witness who – according
to appeals documents – ‘changed his testimony’ regarding whether or not he had
told someone else about the crime he had
witnessed, shortly after making a 911 call
to report it (Defendant-Appellant’s Brief,
1994, p. HUNT-000225). Only 1 witness
exhibited inconsistency between their current testimony and the case facts (14.29%
of 7 applicable). As with the jailhouse
informants, these figures add up to more
than 100.00% because the majority of the
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witnesses exhibited more than one type of
inconsistency in their testimony (57.14% of
7 applicable). Defense attorneys asked all
of the witnesses about their inconsistencies
during cross-examination (100% of 6 available), whereas prosecutors asked only 1
witness about their inconsistencies during
direct examination (16.67% of 6 available).

confide in me. I asked what he had done. That
the police had to have some evidence against
him to indict him’ (Trial Transcript, 1986a, p.
RHK-014866). The defendant had then
allegedly shared that he and his co-defendants
had raped the victim and that one of the codefendants had strangled her in a graveyard.
Outside sources

Sources of information
The cooperating witnesses allegedly came to
know the crime details through various sources. As stated above, 2 witnesses claimed to
know certain crime details from their own witnessing of the event (20.00%); others allegedly
came to know of the crime details through personal conversations with the defendant and
outside sources, as discussed below.
Secondary confessions
Most of the cooperating witnesses’ testimony
includes a secondary confession (70.00%).
Those whose testimony does not include a secondary confession claimed to have been eyewitnesses to the crime (66.67% of 3
applicable) or a friend of the defendant who
had evidence linked to the crime (33.33% of
3 applicable).
The witnesses testified between 2 and 20
months after the alleged secondary confession
had occurred (M ¼ 8.69 months, SD ¼ 6.14
months). When describing how the secondary
confession had occurred, 2 witnesses claimed
that the defendant had confessed after being
asked if he was guilty (28.57% of 7 applicable), 2 witnesses stated that the defendant had
confessed directly to them without any
prompting (28.57% of 7 applicable) and 2 witnesses claimed to have overheard the defendant confess to someone else (28.57% of 7
applicable). In one trial, the defendant had
allegedly confessed to the witness during a
phone conversation from jail that he had committed part of the crime that he was charged
with (i.e. rape) but not the whole crime (i.e.
murder): ‘I had asked [the defendant] to

As another potential explanation for how the
cooperating witnesses came to know the crime
details, defence attorneys questioned 5 witnesses (55.56% of 9 available) and prosecutors
questioned 1 witness (11.11% of 9 available)
regarding whether they had learned about the
crime from sources other than the defendant or
from witnessing the crime themselves. Of
those questioned, 5 witnesses admitted to having had prior knowledge about the crime
(100.00% of 5 applicable) and 4 witnesses testified that they had read about the crime in the
newspaper (80.00% of 5 applicable).
Attorneys’ closing arguments
The coding for the closing statements was separated into statements concerning jailhouse
informants and statements concerning cooperating witnesses (see Table 2). However, if
there were multiple jailhouse informants
within a trial, they were coded as a collective
unit for the corresponding closing statement.
Thus, coding was not recorded per informant
but per closing statement for each trial.
Closing statements for the prosecution
During their closing statements, the prosecution mentioned the jailhouse informants in
94.74% of the trials in which they testified (of
19 available) and the cooperating witnesses in
100.00% of the trials in which they testified
(of 10 total). When the prosecution mentioned
their jailhouse informants, it was done in such
a way as to bolster their credibility and promote trust in their testimony. For example, in
the trial of David Gray, the prosecution argued
that since their informant had already testified
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Table 2. Percentages of variables present in the case materials available that prosecutors and defence
attorneys addressed in their closing arguments.
Jailhouse informants

Cooperating witnesses

Coding
category

Prosecution

Defense

Prosecution

Defense

Informant
mentioned

Present
Absent
Missing
n

94.74%
5.26%
3
19

100.0%
0.00%
2
20

100.0%
0.00%
1
10

81.82%
18.18%
0
11

(Un)truthfulness

Present
Absent
Missing
n

78.95%
21.05%
3
19

100.0%
0.00%
2
20

80.00%
20.00%
1
10

81.82%
18.18%
0
11

Criminal history

Present
Absent
Missing
n

57.89%
42.11%
3
19

85.00%
15.00%
2
20

30.00%
70.00%
1
10

30.00%
70.00%
1
10

Motivation

Present
Absent
Missing
n

42.11%
57.89%
3
19

80.00%
20.00%
2
20

70.00%
30.00%
1
10

80.00%
20.00%
1
10

Incentive

Present
Absent
Missing
n

47.37%
52.63%
3
19

75.00%
25.00%
2
20

70.00%
30.00%
1
10

80.00%
20.00%
1
10

Inconsistencies

Present
Absent
Missing
n

29.41%
70.59%
5
17

66.67%
33.33%
4
18

22.22%
77.78%
2
9

80.00%
20.00%
1
10

Credibility

Present
Absent
Missing
n

40.00%
60.00%
17
5

80.00%
20.00%
17
5

0.00%
0.00%
11
0

0.00%
0.00%
11
0

Non-public facts

Present
Absent
Missing
n

26.32%
73.68%
3
19

10.00%
90.00%
2
20

10.00%
90.00%
1
10

0.00%
100.00%
1
10

Variable

Note: Sample size n þ Missing ¼ N.

multiple times in the past, this actually made
him more reliable:
Now, [the informant] is a bum, but he’s
been used in the past, too, and the
information that he has provided has been
very reliable, in other situations. This is
not uncommon, in law enforcement, and
his information, in the past, was

instrumental in the prosecution of other
cases to successful conclusions, and he
has furnished reliable facts. (Trial
Transcript, 1978a, p. GRAD-000305)

Similarly, throughout the trials, the prosecution mentioned reasons that supported the
truthfulness of the testimony given by the jailhouse informants in 78.95% of the trials (of 19
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available) and by the cooperating witnesses in
80.00% of the trials (of 10 total). In the trial of
David Camm, the prosecution made a point of
mentioning the danger involved in testifying:
‘you don’t make your status in prison nicer
because you testify for the State or cooperate
with the police. It’s not a good thing, as they
say. You actually get threatened’ (Trial
Transcript, 2006, p. CAMD-015391).
Furthermore, the prosecution mentioned the
criminal history of the informants in 57.89%
of the trials in which the jailhouse informants
testified (of 19 available) and 30.00% of the
trials in which the cooperating witnesses testified (of 10 total). Despite the presence of a
criminal record, the prosecution promoted the
trustworthiness of their jailhouse informant in
the case against Alejandro Hernandez, stating:
He’s a burglar. He’s a criminal. Would he
lie? Of course, you have reason to believe
he would. The question doesn’t stop there,
though. Was he lying? And the answer, I
submit, is no. He was very forthright in
his answers about his own past. (Trial
Transcript, 1985a, p. HERN-008418–19)

In this instance, the prosecution argued
that since their jailhouse informant had been
honest and forthcoming about his own criminal past, that must also mean that he was
being honest and forthcoming in his testimony
incriminating Hernandez.
The prosecution also addressed the informants’ motives for testifying. More specifically,
they mentioned the motivations of the jailhouse informants in 42.11% of the trials (of 19
available) and the motivations of the cooperating witnesses in 70.00% of the trials (of 10
total), consistent with Hypothesis 4.
Additionally, the prosecution mentioned the
potential incentives received by the jailhouse
informants in 47.37% of the trials (of 19 available) and by the cooperating witnesses in
70.00% of the trials (of 10 total). In regard to
the content of the testimony, the prosecution
mentioned the presence of inconsistencies
within the testimony of the jailhouse informants in 29.41% of the trials (of 17 available)

and within the testimony of the cooperating
witness in 22.22% of the trials (of 9 available).
However, when the prosecution mentioned
these inconsistencies, it was done in a way that
could potentially have enhanced the credibility
of the informant’s inaccurate testimony. For
example, in David Gray’s trial, the prosecution argued:
He is reciting what he was told [by the
defendant] [ … ]. If he was being told
what the facts were [by the police/
prosecution], his story would have been
right down the line with the facts, in this
case, and it wasn’t. (Trial Transcript,
1978a, p. GRAD-000304)

Thus, the prosecution attempted to use the
presence of inconsistencies to bolster the overall believability of the informant’s testimony.
For trials that had a jailhouse informant testifying for the defence, the prosecution attacked
the credibility of the informant in 40.00% of
the trials (of 5 available). Finally, the prosecution mentioned the presence of non-public
crime details within the testimony of the jailhouse informants in 26.32% of the trials (of 19
available) and within the testimony of the
cooperating witnesses in 10.00% of the trials
(of 10 total).
Closing statements for the defence
The defence mentioned the jailhouse informants for the prosecution in 100.00% of the trials (of 20 available) and the cooperating
witnesses in 81.82% of the trials (n ¼ 11).2
When the defence mentioned these informants,
it was done in such a way as to attack their
credibility and cast suspicion on their testimony. For example, in David Camm’s trial,
the defence recounted how one informant had
altered his testimony after guidance by the
prosecution: ‘And before your very eyes, [the
informant] under [the prosecution’s] skillful
2
The total is 11 instead of 10 because one of the
cooperating witnesses presented two separate closing
statements at two separate trials, so she was
counted twice.
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examination changed his story’ (Trial
Transcript, 2006, p. CAMD-015499). Overall,
throughout the trials, the defence mentioned
reasons as to why the testimony of the jailhouse informants for the prosecution was
untruthful in 100.00% of the trials (of 20 available) and why the testimony of the cooperating
witnesses was untruthful in 81.82% of the trials (n ¼ 11). Furthermore, the defence mentioned the criminal history of the jailhouse
informants for the prosecution in 85.00% of
the trials (of 20 available) and the criminal history of the cooperating witnesses in 30.00% of
the trials (of 10 total). In Calvin Washington’s
trial, the defence stated in regard to the
numerous informants presented by the prosecution: ‘A parade of liars. A parade of admitted liars. Rapists. Burglars. Thieves. Habitual
criminals’ (Trial Transcript, 1987, p.
WASC-002922).
The defence mentioned the motivations for
testifying of the jailhouse informants for the
prosecution in 80.00% of the trials (of 20
available) and the motivations of the cooperating witnesses also in 80.00% of the trials (of
10 total), again consistent with Hypothesis 4.
Additionally, the defence mentioned the potential incentives received by the jailhouse
informants for the prosecution in 75.00% of
the trials (of 20 available) and by the cooperating witnesses in 80.00% of the trials (of 10
total). The defence also mentioned the presence of inconsistencies within the testimony of
the jailhouse informants for the prosecution in
66.67% of the trials (of 18 available) and
within the testimony of the cooperating witness in 80.00% of the trials (of 10 total). In
Calvin Washington’s trial, the defence stated
the following about the prosecution’s cooperating witness: ‘The reason the inconsistencies
are there are not because of faulty memories,
[but] because of faulty stories’ (Trial
Transcript, 1987, p. WASC-002929).
Conversely, in trials that had jailhouse informants testifying for the defence, the defence bolstered the testimony of their own informants in
80.00% of the trials (of 5 available). For
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example, in David Camm’s trial, the defence
stated: ‘for every one of their informants, we
have an informant to inform on their informants’ (Trial Transcript, 2006, p. CAMD015497). Finally, the defence mentioned the
presence of non-public facts within the testimony of the jailhouse informants for the prosecution in just 10.00% of the trials (of 20
available) and did not mention it in any of the
trials with a cooperating witness (of 10 total).
Evidence in the cases
The Innocence Project lists all of the contributing factors to the wrongful convictions of
each DNA exoneree (http://www.innocenceproject.org). The six causes within these cases
are as follows: informants/snitches, false confessions or admissions, eyewitness misidentification,
unvalidated/improper
forensics,
government misconduct and inadequate
defence. In order to gauge whether or not other
evidence contributed to the wrongful conviction of these defendants, we analyzed the frequency of all the contributing factors in each
trial included in this research. The average
number of contributing factors in these cases
is 2.68 (1.68 when excluding informants as a
factor). The range for the number of contributing factors is 1–5 (1–4 excluding informants).
After informants, which are a factor in every
case because of the focus of this study, the
second contributing factor is unvalidated/
improper forensics, which occurred in 12 of
the cases. This is followed by eyewitness misidentification, which occurred in 8 of the
cases. So, it is clear that the informants were
an essential – if not the essential – contributing
factor to the wrongful convictions. However, it
is worth noting that every case analyzed herein
has more than one contributing factor.
Discussion
The present study was designed to better
understand the substance of false informant
testimony. The content analysis has revealed
several consistent patterns across the
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testimonies. Most often the informants testified on behalf of the prosecution and had
extensive criminal backgrounds (especially the
jailhouse informants). Despite this proclivity
for criminal behavior, most of the informants
claimed to be motivated primarily by a moral
imperative – a desire to do the right thing –
and not by their desire to earn an incentive. In
fact, the majority explicitly stated that they
were not getting any benefit for testifying.
Furthermore, across both the cooperating witnesses and the jailhouse informants there is a
consistent pattern of details given during testimony matching the crime fact pattern. As
expected, both the prosecution and the defence
highlighted the secondary confession in their
closing arguments in nearly all of the cases.
The prosecution generally pointed out why the
informants should be believed and emphasized
the sacrifice that they had to make, ignoring
personal risk to deliver their testimony. By
contrast, the defence attorneys were more
likely to focus on discrediting the informants’
testimony. Finally, informant testimony
brought to trial by the defence was relatively
rare – occurring in only 6 of the 28 trials, just
over 20% – and generally was used only to
impeach the prosecution’s own informants.
Theoretical explanations
The jurors’ difficulty in detecting the false testimony given by the informants in these trials
can potentially be explained through truthdefault theory (TDT; Levine, 2014). TDT consists of 14 propositions which explain when to
suspect the presence of a lie, when to conclude
that a lie has been told and the conditions
under which people make truth-lie judgments.
It is centered on the concept that people naturally exist in a truth-default state, evaluating
incoming messages as truthful (Levine, 2014).
This truth-default state is seen as adaptive
because the majority of communication that
people encounter on a daily basis is honest
(Levine, 2014; Serota et al., 2010). In order to
detect deception, the truth-default state has to
be abandoned; however, this only occurs

following a trigger, or cue, which suggests that
deception might be occurring (e.g. an ulterior
motive). The trigger must be a strong enough
indicator of deception to cause an individual to
abandon the truth-default state and enter into a
state of suspicion, in which they actively
believe that deception might be occurring.
Once in this state, the individual actively
searches for evidence of truth or deception. If
there is enough evidence of deception, the
individual then judges the message as deceptive. If there is not enough evidence to make a
judgment, the individual remains in a state
of suspicion and seeks more evidence; if
there is enough evidence of truth, the individual then reverts into the truth-default state and
judges the message as non-deceptive
(Levine, 2014).
Although we cannot know from the present data whether or not the jurors ever entered
into a state of suspicion, TDT identifies a primary factor that could have (and should have)
acted as a trigger – namely, the ulterior
motives of the informants for testifying.
According to TDT, people detect the presence
of an ulterior motive when they become aware
that an individual can better achieve their goal
by lying than by telling the truth. The jurors
should have detected that the jailhouse informants had ulterior motives by realizing first that
they were already incarcerated and therefore
should be identified as dishonest, and second
that their desire to receive the incentive might
have motivated them to give false testimony.
These factors, according to TDT, should have
made the jurors aware of the informants’ ulterior motives, thereby triggering a state of suspicion. Although their criminal history was
addressed in almost 95% of the cases, only a
small percentage of the informants admitted to
receiving an incentive in exchange for their
testimony. This meant that there was little
opportunity to question the credibility of the
informants based on their having been offered
an incentive, and consequently the majority of
the jurors were likely not aware that the
informants had ulterior motives. It might also
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be the case that merely knowing that the
informants had a history of criminality was not
enough to trigger a state of suspicion because
the jurors committed the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). Consistent with previous research, it is plausible that the jurors
believed that the informants had decided to
testify out of a moral imperative to do the right
thing, as the majority of them claimed during
their testimony (Neuschatz et al., 2008).
The data suggest that there are several reasons why the jurors may have been more
likely than not to commit the fundamental
attribution error and fail to enter into a state of
suspicion. First, although all of the defendants
were on trial for rape or murder (two of the
most violent crimes), only some of the informants had a history of committing violent
crimes themselves. Their claims of being morally driven to help put a rapist or murderer
away therefore may not have been perceived
as conflicting strongly with their tendency to
act immorally (but not violently) in the past.
Second, laypeople are less likely to suspect an
ulterior motive when an individual (i.e. the
informant) behaves in a way that works
against their self-interest, as there is no apparent motive to deceive. Approximately 44.74%
of the 38 informants with available data (both
jailhouse informants and cooperating witnesses) gave reasons as to why testifying for
the prosecution was, in fact, acting against
their best interests, such as the danger of being
labeled a snitch in jail or losing time toward
serving their prison sentence. All of these factors could have lessened the chances of the
jurors entering into a state of suspicion according to TDT and, subsequently, remaining in
the truth-default state.
In addition, even if the jurors had entered
into a state of suspicion, this does not mean
that sufficient evidence of deception would
have successfully been detected – merely that
the jurors would have started actively searching for it. In most of the cases (83.33% of 24
available), such evidence came from confronting the informants about inconsistencies in
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their testimony during cross-examination.
However, the fact that all of the trials examined in the current study resulted in wrongful
convictions indicates that these inconsistencies
were insufficient indicators of deception. In
the context of TDT, it is possible that if the
jurors were not in a state of suspicion then
they would not have considered deception as a
possible reason for the inconsistencies, and
would therefore have been more likely
to believe that they had occurred due to a nondeceptive reason, such as forgetfulness or
nervousness. Just such a non-deceptive explanation for the inconsistencies was sometimes
even offered by the prosecutors, as reflected in
25.93% of their closing statements (based on
26 available, regardless of informant
type).However, the results point to an alternative explanation: namely, the matching fact
pattern between the informants’ testimony and
the details of the crime. The high average proportion of factually accurate crime details
given within the testimony may have acted as
strong evidence of truth and thus counteracted
any inconsistencies. Even more compelling,
86.49% of the informants (based on 37 available), both jailhouse informants and cooperating witnesses, gave details that were explicitly
identified as non-public, with prosecutors
pointing to these details as undeniable proof of
the informants’ veracity during their closing
statements in 20.69% of the cases (based on
29 available). So even if the jurors had recognized the inconsistencies as being suggestive
of deception and were aware that the informants were motivated to present false testimony
to attain an incentive, their inability to explain
how the informants knew non-public crime
details may have caused them to believe the
informants nonetheless. The above factors
would have significantly weakened the power
of the inconsistencies to act as an indicator of
deception, which helps to explain why the
jurors wrongfully convicted the defendants
even when the informants exhibited several
testimonial inconsistencies.
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Finally, the jurors’ belief in the legal system could have influenced their perception of
the veracity of the informants. Experts have
argued that the credibility of prosecution witnesses, including jailhouse informants and
cooperating witnesses, is bolstered by implicit
or explicit prosecutorial vouching (see Roth,
2016). Although it cannot be known for sure,
the jurors could have assumed that the mere
fact that the prosecution had called the informants to take the stand was evidence of honest
testimony. Although pro-prosecution biases
cannot be measured in the present sample of
cases, it is notable that 79.31% of the prosecutors included reasons as to why the informants’ testimony must be true in their closing
statements (based on 29 available). Trust in
both the justice system and the prosecutors
may have caused the jurors to become less
sensitive to triggers or more prone to dismissing inconsistencies as evidence of deception,
thus remaining in the truth-default state and
failing to recognize the testimony as fabricated. For instance, jurors’ pretrial beliefs or
biases have been shown to affect both their
perception of evidence and their final verdict
decisions (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Lecci &
Myers, 2008). Altogether, the current study
has found a prevalence of factors which could
impair jurors’ ability to accurately detect false
testimony in the context of TDT.
Limitations
Archival research has the advantage of allowing the analysis of rich, complex, real-world
data but it is not without its limitations. For
example, in most archival research there is a
clear challenge in establishing ground truth.
DNA exonerations therefore provide a unique
opportunity to examine cases in which the testimony – at least of the prosecution’s informants – is indisputably false. However, there is
still much that cannot be determined simply by
reviewing the case files. For example, it is not
possible to determine the extent to which the
jurors considered the inconsistencies in the
informants’ testimony and their stated

motivations for testifying when deliberating
about the charges. Therefore, it is not clear
how much of a role the informants played in
the jurors’ decisions to convict. Whatever
flaws the jurors may have noticed in the
informants’ testimony – if indeed they noticed
them at all – were not sufficient to produce an
acquittal. Future research examining how
informants are perceived by jurors should be
conducted within the context of mock jury
paradigms wherein potential variations in
informant testimony can be tightly controlled
as a reasonable proxy for real-world jury decisions (Bornstein et al., 2017).
We are also constrained in this analysis by
the sample of available cases. For example, it
is a virtual certainty that informants have also
provided false testimony in cases where
wrongful convictions have not yet been identified. Whether or not these cases are systematically different from those analyzed herein is
difficult to determine. Similarly, we do not
have access to cases in which informants provided false testimony but defendants were
rightfully acquitted, or where genuinely guilty
defendants were convicted despite the presence
of false informant testimony. Such cases would
provide useful information about whether or
not jurors’ perceptions of informants can be a
primary justification for their verdicts.
Although these questions cannot be answered
with the cases analyzed herein, future experimental research might identify variables that
can produce persuasive informant testimony.
Another limitation of this research is the
inability to have a control group. Presumably,
there are cases in which informants tell the
truth – and one may question whether or not
the characteristics of honest informants are different from those of lying informants. Because
this study focuses exclusively on wrongful
convictions overturned by DNA evidence,
these cases can only present prosecution
informants that are known to have provided
false testimony in court. Unfortunately, there
is no definitive way to know that an informant
is telling the truth. In order for there to be a
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proper comparison group, a defendant’s guilt
would need to be verified with DNA evidence
alongside informant testimony. Access to
cases in which informants provided confirmed
honest testimony is not readily available.
However, this study could serve as a useful
baseline for future research if a database of
cases involving honest informant testimony
was to be established.
Implications
Assessment of the content of informant testimony is critical to understanding the various
ways in which informants contribute to wrongful convictions. For example, given that jailhouse informants are questioned about their
motives in 87.5% of cases, researchers should
routinely include this variable in studies
designed to better understand why informants
are persuasive. The content analysis conducted
in the current research also speaks to the
importance of understanding how informants
might shape the early stages of investigations.
For example, in their trial testimony, 73.33%
of the jailhouse informants (22 out of 28)
invoked motives for testifying that excluded
any mention of an incentive (e.g. wanting to
do the right thing). Future research should
investigate whether or not these same explanations appear in informants’ first encounters
with prosecutors and detectives. Do informants
try to make themselves believable by invoking
a sense of higher purpose from the outset, or
do these self-serving explanations only emerge
as they are preparing to testify? Knowing how
informants’ explanations for their decision to
testify shift over time might provide fruitful
directions for future research designed to help
detectives and prosecutors appropriately evaluate potential evidence (e.g. Charman
et al., 2019).
The courts have long been aware of the
potential for incentives to produce deceit in
informants (Giglio v. United States, 1972;
United States v. Singleton, 1998). However, in
order to weigh the contribution of incentives
appropriately, jurors first have to know about
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them. Based on the sample of cases analyzed
herein, this information is not regularly
made available to jurors; only 6 of the 28
informants with available data admitted to
receiving an incentive. One reason for this
might be that the incentives which informants receive in exchange for their cooperation typically remain hidden. Prosecutors
rarely negotiate explicit deals with informants prior to their testimony; rather, prosecutors and informants work together with a
shared understanding that an informant’s
positive performance will eventually be
rewarded with tangible benefits (Covey,
2014). The defense attorneys made valiant
efforts to impugn the credibility of these
informants in the absence of information
about incentives; in 67% of the cases they
highlighted the inconsistencies in the informants’ testimony – and in the small number
of cases where an informant testified for the
defence, it was usually to impeach the testimony of the jailhouse informants for the
prosecution. It is important to note that,
unlike prosecutors, defence attorneys cannot
offer incentives to informants. This could
explain why the defence attorneys called
informants at a much lower rate than the
prosecution in the present sample. Given that
the attempts to undermine the informants’
credibility failed, perhaps the simple omission of information about incentives to testify is the primary explanation for why these
informants were believed – the jurors did
not have complete information with which to
evaluate whether or not they were being
deceptive. Without a requirement that all
informants testify about the incentives they
are receiving, the potential for future wrongful convictions based on false informant testimony continues to be strong.
Public significance statement
An examination of the wrongful conviction
cases that utilized informant witnesses highlights why jurors may be unable to detect this
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often deceptive testimony. Prosecution informants typically had extensive criminal backgrounds, denied getting any incentive for their
cooperation, and provided accurate crime
facts. According to Truth-Default Theory, triggers were potentially not readily available for
jurors to be able to detect the deceptive testimony.
Ethical standards
Declaration of conflicts of interest
Jeffrey S. Neuschatz has declared no conflicts
of interest
Danielle K. DeLoach has declared no conflicts
of interest
Megan A. Hillgartner has declared no conflicts
of interest
Melanie B. Fessinger has declared no conflicts
of interest
Stacy A. Wetmore has declared no conflicts
of interest
Amy B. Douglass has declared no conflicts
of interest
Brian H. Bornstein has declared no conflicts
of interest
Alexis M. Le Grand has declared no conflicts
of interest
Ethical approval
This article does not contain any studies with
human participants or animals performed by
any of the authors.

Acknowledgements
The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this publication
are those of the authors and do not reflect the
views of the Innocence Project or Winston
and Strawn, who provided case documentation. The dataset presented in this paper was
also used in another paper submitted for publication in a law review: Melanie B.
Fessinger, Brian H. Bornstein, Jeffrey S.
Neuschatz, Danielle K. DeLoach, Megan A.

Hillgartner, Stacy A. Wetmore, and Amy
Bradfield Douglass, Informants v. Innocents:
Informant Testimony and its Contribution to
Wrongful Convictions (forthcoming and available from the authors). The analysis and presentation of the data between the two papers is
distinct. The authors would like to thank
Daniel Robertson, Alexa Mecikalski, Jake
Davis, Matthew Ameduri, Sanah Hasan,
McKenzie Aldean, Sydney Bebar, Caroline
Yank, Hannah Kaufmann and Cassidy Tiberi
for their tireless efforts in coding the trial
transcripts.

ORCID
Stacy A. Wetmore
http://orcid.org/00000002-5820-3340
Alexis M. Le Grand
http://orcid.org/00000002-1489-7387

References
Bornstein, B. H., Golding, J. M., Neuschatz, J.,
Kimbrough, C., Reed, K., Magyarics, C., &
Luecht, K. (2017). Mock juror sampling
issues in jury simulation research: A metaanalysis. Law and Human Behavior, 41(1),
13–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000223
Carlson, K. A., & Russo, J. E. (2001). Biased
interpretation of evidence by mock jurors.
Journal of Experimental Psychology.
Applied, 7(2), 91–103. https://doi.org/10.
1037/1076-898X.7.2.91
Charman, S., Douglass, A. B., & Mook, A.
(2019). Cognitive bias in forensic decision
making. In N. Brewer & A. B. Douglass
(Eds.), Psychological science and the law
(pp. 30–53). The Guilford Press.
Covey, R. D. (2014). Abolishing jailhouse snitch
testimony. Wake Forest Law Review, 49,
101–157.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/
faculty_pub/1952/
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief. (1994). State v.
Hunt, No. 84-CrS-42263, 17A91 at HUNT000225, HUNT-000276 (N.C.)
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E.,
Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper,
H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological
Bulletin, 129(1), 74–118. https://doi.org/10.
1037/0033-2909.129.1.74
Giglio v. United States. (1972). 405 US 150.

Informant Witnesses
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin,
117(1), 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1037/00332909.117.1.21
Gross, S. R., Jacoby, K., Matheson, D. J., &
Montgomery, N. (2005). Exonerations in the
United States 1989 through 2003. Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology, 95(2),
523–560.
https://scholarlycommons.law.
northwestern.edu/jclc/vol95/iss2/5/
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., & Stromwall,
L. A. (2007). Guilty and innocent suspects’
strategies during police interrogations.
Psychology, Crime & Law, 13(2), 213–227.
https://doi.org/
https://doi.org/10.1080/
10683160600750264
Kassin, S. M. (2015). The social psychology of
false confessions. Social Issues and Policy
Review, 9(1), 25–51. https://doi.org/ https://
doi.org/10.1111/sipr.12009
Key, K. N., Neuschatz, J. S., Bornstein, B. H.,
Wetmore, S. A., Luecht, K. M.,
Dellapaolera, K. S., & Quinlivan, D. S.
(2018). Beliefs about secondary confession evidence: A survey of laypeople and defence attorneys. Psychology, Crime and Law, 24(1), 1–13.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2017.1351968
Lecci, L., & Myers, B. (2008). Individual differences in attitudes relevant to juror decision
making: Development and validation of the
Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ).
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38(8),
2010–2038.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15591816.2008.00378.x
Levine, T. R. (2014). Truth-default theory
(TDT): A theory of human deception and
deception detection. Journal of Language
and Social Psychology, 33(4), 378–392.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X14535916
Neuschatz, J. S., Lawson, D. S., Swanner, J. K.,
Meissner, C. A., & Neuschatz, J. S. (2008).
The effects of accomplice witnesses and jailhouse informants on jury decision making.
Law and Human Behavior, 32(2), 137–149.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-007-9100-1
Neuschatz, J. S., Wilkinson, M. L., Goodsell,
C. A., Wetmore, S. A., Quinlivan, D. S., &
Jones, N. J. (2012). Secondary confessions,
expert testimony, and unreliable testimony.
Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/
27(2), 179–192.
s11896-012-9102-x
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and
his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, 10, 174–221. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60357-3

529

Roth, J. A. (2016). Informant witnesses and the
risk of wrongful convictions. American
Criminal Law Review, 53, 737–797. https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2809282
Serota, K. B., Levine, T. R., & Boster, F. J.
(2010). The prevalence of lying in America:
Three studies of self-reported lies. Human
Communication Research, 36(1), 2–25.
https://doi.org/ https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682958.2009.01366.x
Trial Transcript. (1977). State v. Evans, No. 761106, 76-66504 at EVA-000473 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
April 20).
Trial Transcript. (1978a). People v. Gray, No.
78-CF-124 at GRAD-000304, GRAD000305 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26–Oct. 2).
Trial Transcript. (1978b). People v. Rainge, No.
78-I6-5186 at WILLD-000208 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 29).
Trial Transcript. (1978c). People v. Rainge, No.
78-I6-5186 at WILLD-000706 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 6).
Trial Transcript. (1984). State v. Dedge, No. 82135-CF-A at DED-000735 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 28).
Trial Transcript. (1985a). State v. Hernandez,
Nos. 84-CF-361-01-12, 84-CF-362-01-12,
84-CF-363-01-12 at HERN-008418, HERN008419 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20).
Trial Transcript. (1985b). State v. Hernandez,
Nos. 84-CF-361-01-12, 84-CF-362-01-12,
84-CF-363-01-12 at HERN-034023 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Mar.).
Trial Transcript. (1986a). People v. Restivo, Ind.
No. 61322 at RHK-014802, RHK-014866
(N.Y. Dis. Ct.).
Trial Transcript. (1986b). State v. McCarty, No.
CRF-85-2637 at MCC-004042 (Okla. Dist.
Ct. Mar. 24).
Trial Transcript. (1987). State v. Washington,
No. 87-08-C at WASC-002929 (Tex. D. Ct.
Nov. 30).
Trial Transcript. (1994). People v. Wyniemko,
No. CR-94-2001FC at WYN-000333 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 3).
Trial Transcript. (1996a). State v. Heins, No. 943965-CF at HEI-001748 (Fla. D. Ct. Dec.
16).
Trial Transcript. (1996b). State v. Heins, No. 943965-CF at HEI-001993, HEI-002006 (Fla.
D. Ct. Dec. 17).
Trial Transcript. (2006). State v. Camm, No.
87D02-0506-MR-54
at
CAMD-015391,
CAMD-015497, CAMD-015499 (Ind. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 27).
United States v. Singleton (1998)., 144 F.3d
1343 (10th Cir.).

530

J. S. Neuschatz et al.

Vrij, A., Edward, K., Roberts, K. P., & Bull, R.
(2000). Detecting deceit via analysis of verbal and nonverbal behavior. Journal of
Nonverbal Behavior, 24(4), 239–263. https://
doi.org/10.1023/A:1006610329284
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., & Porter, S. (2010).
Pitfalls and opportunities in nonverbal and verbal lie detection. Psychological Science in the
Public Interest: A Journal of the American
Psychological Society, 11(3), 89–121. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1529100610390861
Wang, G., Chen, H., & Atabakhsh, H. (2004).
Criminal identity deception and deception

detection in law enforcement. Group
Decision and Negotiation, 13(2), 111–127.
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:GRUP.0000021838.
66662.0c
Warden, R. (2005). The snitch system: How
snitch testimony sent Randy Steidl and other
innocent Americans to death row. Center on
Wrongful Convictions.
Wetmore, S. A., Neuschatz, J. S., & Gronlund,
S. D. (2014). On the power of secondaryconfession evidence. Psychology, Crime & Law,
20(4), 339–357. https://doi.org/ https://doi.
org/10.1080/1068316X.2013.777963

